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BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n More than 10 percent of Americans
with recent work experience say they
will continue social distancing after
the COVID-19 pandemic ends, and
another 45 percent say they will do so
in limited ways.
n We uncover this Long Social
Distancing phenomenon in our
monthly Survey of Working
Arrangements and Attitudes.
n People who intend to continue
social distancing are more likely to
be out of the labor force, lowering the
aggregate participation rate by 2.5
percentage points.
n Separate survey questions find that
many individuals remain out of the
labor force because of fears of infection
with COVID-19 or other diseases.
Such fears lower the participation rate
by 2 percentage points.
n Lower labor force participation
reduces the potential output of the
U.S. economy by nearly 1 percent and
shrinks the college wage premium.
n Long Social Distancing and its
effects will likely persist for months, if
not years. As of mid-2022, infection
fears and their correlation with
labor force status don’t seem to be
dissipating over time.

T
he COVID-19 pandemic brought more awareness of the infection risks that come
with face-to-face encounters in public places, including the workplace. Tis shif

in perceptions and its impact on the decision to work emerge clearly in data from
our Survey of Working Arrangements and Attitudes (SWAA; see Barrero, Bloom, and
Davis [2021]). Since May 2020, we have felded the SWAA each month to thousands
of working-age Americans with earnings of at least $10,000 in the prior year. My
new working paper with Nicholas Bloom of Stanford University and Steven J. Davis
of the University of Chicago’s Booth School of Business and the Hoover Institution
(Barrero, Bloom, and Davis 2022) uses SWAA data from February to July 2022 to
examine respondents’ social distancing intentions and how they infuence labor force
participation, potential output, and the college wage premium.
More than 10 percent of SWAA respondents say they will not return to pre-COVID
activities afer the pandemic ends. Instead, they plan to avoid subways, crowded
elevators, taxis, ride-hailing services, and dining at indoor restaurants. Another 45
percent say they will continue limited forms of social distancing. We refer to this
phenomenon as “Long Social Distancing,” by analogy with Long COVID.
Despite the past-year earnings requirement to be included in the survey, many SWAA
participants were not in the labor force (neither working nor seeking work) during the
survey reference week. When asked why, 9 percent cited “worries about catching COVID
or other infectious diseases” as the main reason. Another 13 percent gave concerns
about infection as a secondary reason. Tese concerns correlate with social distancing
intentions and depress labor force participation by 2 percentage points in our sample.
SWAA respondents with stronger preferences for continued social distancing are
more likely to be out of the labor force. Compared to the case in which everyone returns
fully to the in-person activities they engaged in before the pandemic, this pattern implies
a 2.5 percentage point drag on labor force participation. Te relationship is stronger
among those without bachelor’s degrees, due in part to fewer opportunities for remote
work, which would allow for continued social distancing while staying in the labor force.
Long Social Distancing has implications for the U.S. economy and for the wage
distribution. Because fewer persons are available for work, potential national output
is 1 percent—about $250 billion—lower than it would otherwise be. But Long Social
Distancing pushes comparatively more non-college-educated workers out of the
labor force, raising the wages of those remaining and thus shrinking the college wage
premium—the percentage diference in average wages between college- and non-collegeeducated workers—by 1.0 to 2.6 percentage points.

Long Social Distancing
For additional details, see the full working
paper at https://research.upjohn.org/up_
workingpapers/22-376/.

We examine social distancing intentions using a long-running series of SWAA
questions frst felded in July 2020. Te most recent version (felded since June 2022) reads
as follows:1
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We refer to intentions to
continue at least some
forms of social distancing
afer the pandemic as
“Long Social Distancing,”
by analogy with Long
COVID.

As the COVID-19 pandemic ends, which of the following would best ft your views on
social distancing?
a) Complete return to pre-COVID activities
b) Substantial return to pre-COVID activities, but I would still be wary of things like
riding the subway or getting into a crowded elevator
c) Partial return to pre-COVID activities, but I would be wary of many activities like
eating out or using Uber, Lyf, or other ride-hailing services
d) No return to pre-COVID activities, as I will continue to social distance
Figure 1 shows the distribution of responses to this question for the period of
February through July 2022. One in eight respondents intend to have “no return to preCOVID activities,” continuing to social distance instead. Just under half (46 percent) plan
either a “substantial” or “partial” return. Only 42 percent plan a “complete” return. We
refer to intentions to continue at least some forms of social distancing afer the pandemic
as “Long Social Distancing.”
Figure 1 Long Social Distancing: 12.5% of Respondents Plan No Return to PreCOVID Activities after the Pandemic Ends, and a Combined 45.5% Plan
Less Than a Complete Return
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NOTE: The fgure shows the latest results of the survey question underlying the data. The sample includes
respondents from the February 2022 to July 2022 SWAA waves. The SWAA samples U.S. residents aged 20
to 64 who earned $10,000 or more in 2019 or 2021. (In February, we randomized across the two years and
asked about 2021 starting with the March survey.) N = 27,632.

Because we have felded this survey question since 2020, we can examine
how preferences for continued social distancing have shifed over time. Rates of
hospitalization and deaths attributed to COVID have fallen markedly but unevenly since
2020, so it is reasonable to hypothesize that social distancing intentions have also fallen.
Indeed, the share of people planning a complete return rises from about 25 percent in
July 2020 to more than 40 percent in all but one of the frst seven months of 2022. But the
share that intends “no return to pre-COVID activities” has stabilized since Summer 2021
We have modifed the initial clause to keep the focus on a post-pandemic future. Between October 2021
and May 2022, the question began with “Once the COVID-19 pandemic has ended…” with nearly identical
response options. Earlier, the initial clause referenced vaccine developments and uptake, since the prevailing
view was that vaccine-induced herd immunity would end the pandemic.
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has implications for
the U.S. economy.
Because fewer persons
are available for work,
potential national output
is 1.0 percent—about
$250 billion—lower than
it would otherwise be.
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at roughly 12 percent. Tus, a persistent minority of U.S. residents have not budged in
their plans to continue social distancing, regardless of changes in the pandemic situation.
Te prevalence of the strong form of Long Social Distancing (“No return to preCOVID activities”) falls with education and earnings, rises with age, and is higher for
women than for men at all ages. Indeed, people with less education and lower earnings
have a higher incidence of pre-existing health conditions that place them at greater risk
of COVID and other infectious diseases. Tey also tend to work in jobs where it is harder
to avoid interacting with others. Older people are also at greater risk from COVID-19,
which has been well known since the start of the pandemic. Women are more likely to
be primary caregivers for children and the elderly, so they may take more precautions to
protect those in their care.

Infection Worries Deter Labor Force Participation
Since February 2022, we have asked the following question to SWAA respondents who
are not in the labor force:
Are worries about catching COVID or other infectious diseases a factor in your decision not
to seek work at this time?
a) Yes, the main reason
b) Yes, a secondary reason
c) No
Tis question elicits the respondent’s own assessment of whether infection worries
directly afect his or her decision not to seek work. We deliberately frame the question in
terms of “catching COVID or other infectious diseases” to allow for the possibility that
the pandemic experience increased the salience of all work-related infection risks, not
just COVID-related ones.
As shown in Figure 2, 9.3 percent of respondents who are out of the labor force cite
infection worries as the main reason for not seeking work, and another 12.5 percent cite
such worries as a secondary reason. Tese results provide direct evidence that infection
worries deterred labor force participation between February and July 2022.
Figure 2 A Combined Total of 22% of Sampled Persons Who Are Neither Working
Nor Seeking Work Cite Infection Concerns as Either a Secondary or a
Main Reason
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NOTE: The sample includes respondents to the February and July 2022 SWAA who passed the attention
check questions and indicated their working status in the week prior to the survey as “Not working, and
not looking for work.” The SWAA samples U.S. residents aged 20 to 64 who earned $10,000 or more in 2019.
From February to July of 2022, 10.9% of all respondents were not working and not seeking work. N = 3,081.
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Compared to those
who plan a “complete
return to pre-COVID
activities,” persons who
plan “no return” are
15.3 percentage points
more likely to be out of
the labor force—a huge
diference.

We quantify the impact of infection worries on the size of the labor force based on
responses to the question above. For labor force nonparticipants who cite infection
worries as the main reason, we attribute nonparticipation fully to infection worries; for
those who cite it as a secondary reason, we attribute a weight of 50 percent. We attribute
no role to infection worries for those outside the labor force for other reasons (the “No”
response in the question above), as well as those who are employed or unemployed.
Combining these attributions with the shares of each group in our survey, we estimate
that infection worries lowered the labor force participation rate by 2 percentage points
during the period from February to July 2022. On an earnings-weighted basis, however,
the estimated drag is just 1.4 percentage points, because high earners (as measured by
prior-year income) are less likely to say they are not seeking work because of infection
fears.

Social Distancing Intentions and Labor Force Participation
Besides quantifying the impact of Long Social Distancing on labor force participation
through infection worries, we also estimate this relationship using social distancing
preferences. Compared to those who plan a “complete return to pre-COVID activities,”
persons who plan “no return” are 15.3 percentage points more likely to be out of the
labor force—a huge diference. Tose who plan a “partial return” are 4.1 percentage
points more likely to be out of the labor force, and those who plan a “substantial return”
are 0.4 points more likely.
How much higher would labor force participation be if all survey participants planned
a “complete return to pre-COVID activities,” holding constant the empirical relationship
between social-distancing intentions and participation? Te answer is about 2.5
percentage points, which is statistically robust to controlling for a battery of respondent
characteristics.
However, social distancing intentions are stronger predictors of labor force
participation among certain demographic groups, especially those with lower education.
Performing the same exercise among respondents who did not attend college, we fnd
a labor force participation efect of 4.8 percentage points; among respondents with a
bachelor’s degree or more, the efect is a statistically insignifcant 1 percentage point.
Tese group-specifc estimates are highly consistent in magnitude with analogous
estimates we obtain from the infection-fears approach discussed above.

Implications and Prospects for the Future
Depressed labor force participation reduces the potential output of the U.S. economy.
To estimate by how much, we assume workers produce proportionately according to
their annual earnings (which is roughly consistent with ofcial practice). Our estimates
of the impact of Long Social Distancing, whether through infection worries or social
distancing preferences, imply a reduction in aggregate earnings of about 1.4 percent.
Because a 1 percent increase in labor earnings translates into approximately a 0.7 percent
increase in output, Long Social Distancing results in roughly a 1 percent reduction in
gross domestic product (GDP).
On the other hand, Long Social Distancing depresses labor force participation
disproportionately for non-college-educated workers, so it makes them relatively
scarce and thus raises their wages relative to those of college-educated workers. Our
two approaches imply that the college wage premium—the ratio between the wages of
college-educated and non-college-educated workers—shrinks by between 0.9 and 2.5
percentage points because of the relative scarcity of non-college-educated workers.
Finally, we fnd little evidence that the efects of Long Social Distancing are dissipating
over time. We fnd no discernible change in social distancing intentions coinciding with
the roughly 75 percent drop in COVID deaths since early 2022. And our estimates of
the relationship between social distancing intentions and labor force participation have
4
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strengthened between July 2020 and July 2022. Tat pattern aligns with other evidence
that searing personal experiences have persistent efects on perceptions and risk-taking
behavior (Malmendier and Wachter 2022). At the same time, negative experiences
and perceptions associated with COVID-19 have continued to accumulate as the virus
has approached endemic status and Long COVID has become an increasingly greater
concern.
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